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Abstract
We present an approach for the verification and validation (V&V) of
robot assistants in the context of human-robot interactions (HRI), to demon-
strate their trustworthiness through corroborative evidence of their safety and
functional correctness. Trust in robot assistants will allow them to transi-
tion from the laboratory into our everyday lives. Key challenges include the
complex and unpredictable nature of the real world in which assistant and
service robots operate, the limitations on available V&V techniques when
used individually, and the consequent lack of confidence in the V&V re-
sults. Our approach, called corroborative V&V , addresses these challenges
by combining several different V&V techniques; in this paper we use formal
verification (model checking), simulation-based testing, and user validation
in experiments with a real robot. We demonstrate our corroborative V&V ap-
proach through a handover task, the most critical part of a complex coopera-
tive manufacturing scenario, for which we propose some safety and liveness
requirements to verify and validate. We construct formal models, simula-
tions and an experimental test rig for the HRI. To capture requirements we
use temporal logic properties, assertion checkers and textual descriptions.
This combination of approaches allows V&V of the HRI task at different
levels of modelling detail and thoroughness of exploration, thus overcoming
the individual limitations of each technique. Should the resulting V&V evi-
dence present discrepancies, an iterative process between the different V&V
techniques takes place until corroboration between the V&V techniques is
gained from refining and improving the assets (i.e., system and requirement
models) to represent the HRI task in a more truthful manner. Therefore, cor-
roborative V&V affords a systematic approach to “‘meta-V&V,” in which
different V&V techniques can be used to corroborate and check one another,
increasing the level of certainty in the results of V&V.
∗Corresponding author. Email: matt@liverpool.ac.uk
†Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
‡Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
§Bristol Robotics Laboratory, Bristol, UK
¶Faculty of Environment and Technology, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
8.
07
40
3v
2 
 [c
s.R
O]
  1
5 A
ug
 20
18
1 Introduction
Robotic assistants that interact with people in an informal, unstructured, and com-
plex manner are increasingly being considered for industrial and domestic do-
mains. In manufacturing, the drive towards more flexible production, quality and
consistency in the production, and the reduction of tiring and dangerous tasks re-
quires that humans work near robots, or even teach and physically interact with
them as co-workers.
A way to enhance robots, to allow their safe and trustworthy participation in
human–robot interactions (HRI), is the incorporation of safety and fault-recovery
mechanisms at all levels, from low-level mechanical systems and basic controllers
to higher-level, decision-making systems (Alami et al., 2006; Pipe et al., 2011).
For example, restricting motion when near humans has been applied as a low-level
safety solution (Pedrocchi et al., 2013). However, to allow robot assistants to tran-
sition from research laboratories and very limited application scenarios (such as
surveillance, transport or entertainment) to the broader domestic and industrial do-
mains, they need to be demonstrably trustworthy (Eder et al., 2014). Collaborative
robots will also need to conform to recent standards, e.g., ISO 10218 (2011), ISO
13482 (2014) and ISO 15066 (2016). Thus, HRI requires the development of co-
herent and credible frameworks for verification and validation (V&V).
A major challenge in V&V of robot assistants is that no single technique is ad-
equate to cover the whole system in practice. “Correct” functioning in an HRI sce-
nario is likely to depend on precise physical details as well as complex high-level
interactions. Individually, formal methods such as model checking and theorem
proving, simulation-based testing, or experiments in real-world scenarios cannot
examine the entire state space of the interaction with realistic detail. The advan-
tages of these techniques — formal, simulation and experiments — in terms of cov-
erability (i.e., the exploration of the state space such as combinations of human–
robot actions, or motion ranges) and realism can be exploited when combining
them.
Combining V&V techniques in the HRI domain yields an additional benefit
— trust in the correctness of V&V results. When using a single V&V technique
this is hard to achieve. System models used in formal methods or simulation-
based testing, and requirements models, are subject to manual input errors, despite
efforts in automating translations between models and translations from code to
models. The use of complementary V&V techniques can highlight discrepancies
and help system developers gain confidence in the resulting evidence about safety
and liveness requirements.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our contribution, presented in this paper, is twofold:
1. To propose an approach to the verification and validation of robots and au-
tonomous systems that allows different V&V techniques to corroborate one
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another, and where the outcomes from applying one technique are used to
improve the other techniques. This approach, called corroborative V&V,
provides a greater degree of certainty in the V&V results than would be
found in using the V&V techniques individually.
2. To demonstrate the effectiveness of corroborative V&V by applying it to the
most critical part of a collaborative manufacturing HRI scenario, the robot-
to-human handover task.
In this paper we combine formal methods, simulation-based testing, and user vali-
dation through experiments with a real robot, in the context of HRI. If the evidence
agrees when verifying and validating the same requirement through the three tech-
niques, we will be more confident in the results. Otherwise, an iterative process is
used to refine and improve the truthfulness of the assets, the system and require-
ment models underpinning each technique. Hence, corroborative V&V provides
increased confidence in the evidence, compared to using V&V techniques in isola-
tion. At the same time, by enabling V&V to span across multiple levels of detail
or abstraction, our approach provides a thorough exploration of the robot’s range
of behaviours, thus overcoming limitations of individual V&V techniques.
The proposed approach is exemplified through an object handover task, the
most critical component of a cooperative manufacture scenario, for the BERT 2
robot (Lenz et al., 2010). We formulated safety and liveness requirements based
on relevant standards. We then used this case study to show that corroborative
V&V can provide a higher degree of confidence than when using V&V techniques
in isolation. The instantiation of our approach for the case study comprises, as
V&V techniques, probabilistic model checking in PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al.,
2011), simulation-based testing in ROS1 and Gazebo2, and an experimental setup
in the Bristol Robotics Laboratory (BRL).
A formal model comprising Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) was con-
structed by hand, representing the HRI. Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
(PCTL∗) (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011) properties were derived from the require-
ments, to be verified against the formal model. We developed a simulator in ROS–
Gazebo, with the real code for the robot and a simulated human co-worker. Tests
were derived from model-based and pseudorandom techniques, as in our previ-
ous work in (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016), to stimulate the HRI components
towards checking the satisfaction of the requirements. Automated checkers im-
plemented as assertion monitors, as described in (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016),
were also derived from the requirements and added into the simulator. Applying
the complementary V&V techniques exposed discrepancies in the resulting evi-
dence, allowing the assets to be examined and refined. Iterating over this process
led to agreement between the three techniques, thus providing greater confidence
in the correctness of the resulting evidence and the suitability of subsequent design
1http://www.ros.org/
2http://gazebosim.org/
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recommendations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the corroborative V&V ap-
proach, outlining the V&V techniques, their corresponding assets to be developed
from the HRI system and its requirements, and their interactions to gain confidence
in the resulting evidence. We then introduce the case study, the handover task, and
the requirements to be verified in Section 3. Next, we present the instantiation of
the proposed corroborative V&V approach for the case study in Section 4, includ-
ing the development of assets comprising the formal model, the simulator, and the
translations of the requirements into logical properties and assertions. We present
the V&V results for two of the proposed requirements in Section 5, describing in
detail the encountered evidence discrepancies, with the consequent asset refine-
ment and improvement processes until reaching a high degree of corroboration
between the V&V results. In Section 6 we then demonstrate V&V of the remain-
ing requirements using the three V&V techniques. Section 7 discusses the findings
and limitations in the application of the corroborative V&V approach to our case
study. In Section 8 we compare our approach to others in the literature, highlight-
ing how corroborative V&V provides a novel V&V framework and complements
existing approaches. Finally, we offer conclusions and directions for future work
in Section 9.
2 Corroborative V&V
As noted in the introduction, corroborative V&V provides a thorough exploration
of the robot’s range of behaviours across multiple levels of abstraction, thus over-
coming limitations of individual V&V techniques. Our approach to the V&V of
human–robot teams is shown in Figure 1. We propose the combined use of multiple
techniques to verify and validate robots in HRI tasks, which are shown in ellipses.
Each technique is underpinned by two assets: a requirements model, shown in a
rectangle, and a system model, shown in an octagon. In this paper we focus on the
use of three particular V&V techniques, but other methodologies can be integrated
into the corroborative V&V process if required. This is discussed in more detail
in Section 7.1. We introduce the techniques, the assets and the corroborative V&V
workflows, indicated by the arrows in Figure 1, in the following subsections.
2.1 V&V Techniques
Formal verification encapsulates a set of mathematical techniques which are used
to prove properties about a formal model of a system. Some of the most com-
mon formal verification techniques are model checking (Clarke et al., 1999) and
theorem proving (Fitting, 1996). In this paper we use model checking, which lets
us verify that formal models (which represent the robot and its non-deterministic
environment) satisfy temporal logical properties (derived from requirements) for
every possible way in which the models can be executed. As we examine every
4
Figure 1: A framework for corroborative V&V.
possible execution of the formal model, we can demonstrate whether or not the
model satisfies the temporal logical properties.
In “traditional” model checking, finite state machines are modelled and ex-
plored exhaustively in order to determine whether some property holds (Clarke
et al., 1999). Properties are typically expressed as logical formulae written in a
logical language, e.g., linear-time temporal logic (LTL) or computation-tree logic
(CTL). The output of a model checker is typically a Boolean value, true or false, in-
dicating whether the model satisfies a given property. In the case where the model
does not satisfy the property, an “error trace” or counter-example is output describ-
ing the sequence of states which led to the violation of the property (Fisher, 2011).
Probabilistic model checking, explained further in Section 4.1, extends this method
to allow the computation of the probability that a given property will be satisfied.
Simulation-based testing involves running a simulator under different inputs
(or tests), to observe the resulting outputs and determine if the simulated system be-
haves as intended. Software and hardware components can be modelled to achieve
an appropriate compromise between realism, modelling effort, and computational
cost, and real code can be run. Nonetheless, the exploration of a system under test
is not exhaustive. Systematic methodologies to explore the system under test, such
as Coverage-Driven Verification (CDV) (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016), should be
used to increase efficiency and effectiveness under computational constraints. A
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CDV testing process needs testbench components, including a test generator and
a driver, to stimulate the system under test, a coverage collector, to keep track of
the V&V progress, and a checker modelling the requirements and automating the
checking (Piziali, 2004).
Experiments are performed within a test rig to verify and validate robots in-
teracting in realistic environments with respect to textual requirements. As exper-
iments often involve human volunteers, health and safety assessments and expen-
sive equipment, the number of times that a particular scenario can be examined is
often severely limited when compared to simulation or formal verification. In this
paper, experiments are focused towards achieving clear evidence on the principal
requirements, as well as to ground the corroborative V&V process in reality.
The diagonal axis in Figure 1 arranges the three techniques based on how re-
alistic and how coverable they are, where coverability refers to how much of its
asset a technique can analyze. Note that there is generally a trade-off between
realism and coverability. Formal verification (e.g., using a model checker) can
exhaustively check the entire state-space of a formal model (Clarke et al., 1999),
while simulation-based testing only samples the state-space of a simulation model.
However, a simulation model is able to better account for physical details that are
difficult to capture in a formal model, such as physical dynamics, and is therefore
able to more realistically model the actual system. Physical experiments are even
more realistic, but the number of experiments that can be performed will likely be
significantly lower than the number of simulations that can be performed, since ex-
periments are more heavily constrained by time and other resources. Additionally,
physical experiments can be adversely constrained by ethical or safety concerns
which are not an issue in simulation-based testing and formal verification.
2.2 V&V Assets
In Figure 1 it is shown that requirements can be modelled in a number of ways. Tex-
tual requirements are the written requirements that describe the desired behaviour
of a robot and can also include some assumptions about the human user’s behaviour
and the environment in which the robot operates (e.g., materials required to com-
plete the task are available at the start). Textual requirements are used in exper-
iments to determine whether the robot (i.e., the physical system) satisfies them.
Textual requirements for robots are typically based on the needs of the system’s
users but are increasingly based on legal or ethical frameworks specified by a regu-
latory or standards authority. For example, ISO 15066 (2016) defines many safety
requirements for collaborative robots. In practice, verifying a textual requirement
in experiments may necessitate refinement of the text with consideration for the
actual scenario, to avoid ambiguities.
Assertions are requirements of a system expressed in an assertion specification
language using the syntax of programming languages such as C or Python (Fos-
ter et al., 2004), or as assertion monitors, such as the ones implemented in (Huang
et al., 2014a; Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016). Assertions are commonly formulated
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in a precondition-implies-postcondition manner, and can be implemented directly
in the code under testing, or within the simulation models. Tools are available
to convert temporal logical properties into monitors for runtime verification, as
in (Havelund and Rosu, 2002; Huang et al., 2014a), the latter for testing robots.
The systems under verification are stimulated to attempt triggering the precondi-
tions in the assertions and consequently a check of their respective postconditions.
The outcomes of these checks are interpreted to determine if the requirements are
satisfied.
A software simulator, usually written in a high-level programming language,
contains models of the robot’s behaviour as well as its environment. In simulation-
based testing, the simulator program is executed multiple times (computation time
allowing), to collect information from the assertion checks and the simulation it-
self. As mentioned in the introduction, a number of both open-source and pro-
prietary simulation and development frameworks exists in robotics, such as ROS,
Player/Stage, Gazebo, V-REP, Webots and others.
Logical properties are logical statements, each of which captures one or more
requirements of the system using some formal logic. Different logics can be used
for different applications; e.g., if we want to capture requirements relating to time
we might use Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) (Fisher, 2011). Alternatively, if we
are interested in the probability of the requirement being met then we may use
probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL∗). Formal modelling tools specialize
in supporting particular types of formal models and temporal logics, such as PCTL∗
by PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011). Formal models are discrete computational
descriptions of high-level behaviours. Finite State Automata (FSA) (Clarke et al.,
1999) and Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) (Parker, 2016) are two examples.
Figure 1 arranges the requirements models in order of how expressive or pre-
cise they are. “Expressivity” here refers to the breadth of realism that could be
referred to in the requirement model, while “precision” refers to how specific the
expressions may be. A single requirement may be implemented as assertions in
many ways, e.g., according to interpretations by different programmers. As asser-
tions are based on programming languages whose semantics are more well-defined
than natural languages, we consider assertions to be more precise than textual re-
quirements. Logical properties are, in turn, more precise than assertions and textual
requirements, as they have precise, mathematical definitions. On the other hand,
assertions can be more expressive than the logical properties, as they can capture
aspects of the system which are difficult to specify at higher levels of abstraction
(e.g., physical states that depend on modelled dynamics). However the assertions
are less expressive than the textual requirements: subjective requirements such as
user satisfaction are difficult to model in programming languages. It should also
be noted that the more realistic levels of the framework can support a broader set
of requirements, since they allow the monitoring of parameters or analysis of com-
ponents that might not be available in more abstract models.
Ideally, the assets mentioned before would be generated during the develop-
ment of the robot itself. For example, textual requirements would be developed
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at the start of the traditional product engineering life cycle and may be based on
standards and regulations such as ISO 10218 (2011) for industrial robots. At the
next stage in the life cycle the product would be designed. Simulation and formal
analysis are often used in the hardware and software domains at the design stage in
order to gain confidence in the correctness of the design with respect to the speci-
fications. Hence formal models and simulators would be developed. This practice
can be adopted for the design of robot assistants, as demonstrated by Kirwan et al.
(2013) for autonomous navigation. Experiments would be performed during im-
plementation of the robot system in real life HRI, after designing the corresponding
setup. If it is not possible to develop all assets during the initial development of
the human–robot system — e.g., if the human–robot system has already been de-
veloped — the approach can still be applied. In this case, it is necessary to develop
assets based on existing materials.
Re-examining equivalent requirements implemented at different abstraction
levels of the framework provides an opportunity to refine individual assets to rep-
resent the HRI more accurately and truthfully, making the framework robust with
respect to human error and providing a high degree of confidence in the resulting
evidence. When refining the assets, complexity needs to be carefully managed,
e.g. through abstraction. Re-modelling formal models and simulators can result in
a state-space explosion and a significant increase in time and memory (Clarke et al.,
2012). As explained previously, each level of our framework represents a different
compromise between realism and the coverability of the state space. Any decisions
affecting the balance of this compromise should be made by those conducting the
V&V.
The bidirectional arrows between the different system models in Figure 1, and
between the different requirements models, indicate that the development of any
of these models may be informed by the equivalent model at another level of ab-
straction. Such development may be carried out manually or using some of the
techniques mentioned in Section 8. Our framework allows for the incorporation of
such techniques to suit the application in question.
2.3 Workflows
Our approach leaves open the order in which the different V&V techniques in
Figure 1 should be used. Such decisions should be made with consideration for the
specific HRI application in question. Furthermore, these decisions will typically
be made in a reactive manner, because insights gained from any of the techniques
can lead to modifications in any of the system models or requirements models,
necessitating a further stage of V&V to increase confidence in the results, possibly
with a different technique.
For example, we could start with a set of logical properties and a formal model
of the robot system. Formal verification would then be used to verify that the for-
mal model satisfies the logical properties. This process is indicated by the arrows
from “Logical Properties” and “Formal Model” to “Formal Verification” in Fig-
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ure 1. The result of formal verification is evidence that the formal model is correct
with respect to the logical properties. During this V&V, we may discover that the
formal model does not satisfy a particular property. If we trust this V&V result,
modifications to the formal model may be an appropriate way to explore possi-
ble design modifications. The “Simulator” and “Test Rig” would then need to be
updated accordingly, as represented by the bi-directional dashed arrows between
system models in Figure 1. Alternatively, the property violation may be due to an
error in the model or in the logical property (i.e., we have incorrectly formalised a
requirement). We may wish to manually revise the properties or formal model (or
both) if the fault lies there. This is indicated by the arrows from “Formal Verifica-
tion” back to “Logical Properties” and “Formal Model.” Similarly, we may wish to
gain more confidence in the correctness of the formal model and logical properties
by employing one of the other V&V techniques, before proceeding to modify the
real system and the other assets.
The same requirements, implemented as assertions, could then be monitored
during simulation-based testing, providing more V&V evidence. This technique is
indicated by the arrows from “Simulator” and “Assertions” to “Simulation-based
Testing.” During testing we may find requirement violations, as we did with for-
mal verification, and we have to decide a course of action: revising the relevant
assets (e.g. the simulator or the assertions), or proceeding to compare the results
with experiments to gain more confidence, if results were similar to formal verifi-
cation. (The comparison between the outputs of the V&V techniques is indicated
by the bold arrows in Figure 1.) On the other hand, evidence generated by the
simulation may not align with evidence generated by the other V&V techniques,
resulting in a lack of corroboration. There are a number of potential causes of such
disagreements:
• System model inaccuracies. All the V&V techniques use models of the real-
world. The models might have been constructed erroneously, or may be
inconsistent with the real world, or relative to one another.
• Requirement model inaccuracies. In our approach, the real-world require-
ments of the system are converted into textual requirements, assertions and
properties for V&V. These requirements models may not have been correctly
formulated.
• Tool inaccuracies. It is possible that numerical approximations affect the
V&V results. In addition, third party tools can contain bugs that are un-
known.
We could now proceed to perform “Experiments.” As before, we may find a prob-
lem with the textual requirements or the robot’s test rig during experimentation.
At the same time, the evidence from formal verification and/or simulation-based
testing can be compared against the experiment results. We may also discover that
one of the requirements is satisfied during simulation-based testing or formal ver-
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ification but not during the experiments. In this case we may need to refine any of
the other assets, as explained before.
Careful comparisons must be made between the different representations in or-
der to discover the cause of the conflicts. Such comparisons are indicated by the
bi-directional bold arrows between “Formal Verification” and “Simulation-based
Testing,” “Simulation-based Testing” and “Experiments,” and “Formal Verifica-
tion” and “Experiments,” respectively, in Figure 1.
3 The BERT Handover Task: A Case Study
Corroborative V&V can be used to provide a higher degree of confidence in the
V&V evidence than when using V&V techniques in isolation. In this section, we
present an (intentionally) simple HRI case study to demonstrate this. The cor-
roborative V&V of a more complex case study would have been difficult to fully
explain within the bounds of this paper. It was thought preferable to cover a sim-
pler scenario in a high level of detail, rather than a more complex HRI scenario
in less detail. Nevertheless, corroborative V&V may be applied to more complex
scenarios than the one presented here.
Despite its simplicity, our HRI case study concerns robot-to-human handover,
the most critical part in a human–robot collaborative manufacturing task. The case
study uses BERT 2, an upper-body humanoid robot designed to facilitate research
into complex human-robot interactions, including verbal and non-verbal commu-
nication, such as gaze and physical gestures (Lenz et al., 2010) (see Figure 2).
BERT 2’s software architecture was originally developed using YARP3. More re-
cently, this system has been wrapped with a ROS interface.
We verify an object handover to exemplify our approach, in the context of a
broader collaborative manufacture scenario where BERT 2 and a person work to-
gether to assemble a table (Lenz et al., 2012). In the handover, the first step is an
activation signal from the human to the robot. BERT 2 then picks up a nearby ob-
ject and holds it out to the human. The robot announces that it is ready to handover.
The human responds verbally to indicate that they are ready to receive. (For prac-
tical reasons, human-to-robot verbal signals were relayed to the robot by a human
operator pressing a key.) Then, the human is expected to pull gently on the object
while looking at it. BERT 2 then calculates three binary sensor conditions:
• Gaze: The human’s head position and orientation relative to the object are
tracked using the Vicon R© motion-tracking system for an approximate mea-
sure of whether he/she is looking at the object.
• Pressure: Changes in the robot’s finger positions are sensed to detect whether
the human is applying pressure to take the weight of the object.
3http://www.yarp.it
10
Figure 2: BERT 2 in the handover task test rig.
• Location: The Vicon R© motion-tracking system is used to determine whether
the human’s hand is located on the object.
The sensor conditions must be calculated within a time threshold for BERT 2 to
determine if the human “is ready.” The robot should release its grip on the ob-
ject if all three conditions are satisfied. Otherwise, the robot should terminate the
handover and not release the object. The human may disengage and the robot can
timeout, which would cancel the remainder of the handover task. The sensors are
not completely accurate and may sometimes give incorrect readings.
3.1 System Requirements
A safety requirement ensures that “nothing bad happens,” whereas a liveness
requirement ensures that “something good happens eventually” or inside a thresh-
old of time for practical reasons (e.g., in simulation). The requirements for any
HRI task depend on its safety and functional context. For example, in our case
study the robot would need to achieve a particular handover success rate threshold
to keep up with manufacturing throughput or avoid unacceptable damage costs, as
per the users’ requirements. We considered two different thresholds for our first
functional requirement, based on estimates of acceptable productivity in two dif-
ferent settings. The first threshold is considered for deployed use in a hypothetical
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manufacturing environment.
Req. 1a: At least 95% of handover attempts should be completed successfully.
In a research and development environment, a lower threshold may be considered
satisfactory to provide proof-of-concept, showing that the system works most of
the time.
Req. 1b: At least 60% of handover attempts should be completed successfully.
The following requirements were chosen to illustrate our approach, inspired by Grig-
ore et al. (2011) and drawing from standards ISO 10218 (2011) for industrial
robots, ISO 13482 (2014) for personal care robots, and ISO 15066 (2016) for col-
laborative robots:
Req. 2: If the human is not ready, the robot shall not hand over the object.
Req. 3: If the human is ready, the robot shall hand over the object.
Req. 4: The robot always reaches a decision within a threshold of time.
Req. 5: The robot shall always either time out, decide to release the object, or
decide not to release the object.
Req. 6: The robot shall not close its hand when the human is too close.
Req. 7: The robot shall start in restricted speed.
Req. 8: If the robot is within 10 cm of the human, the robot’s hand speed is
less than 250 mm/s.
These requirements are ambiguous in terms of how they are assessed over the avail-
able system information, reflecting the generality of the standards and the shortfalls
of using natural language when first establishing requirements. In order to verify
and validate them, we need to interpret them in terms of available variables and
system behaviours according to the assets.
4 Corroborative V&V of the Case Study
After establishing the system’s requirements, we developed a plan for the applica-
tion of corroborative V&V to the case study. We chose to focus on a “typical use
case” for the handover task, in which the human has a working familiarity with
the robot and intends to complete the task successfully. Any of the requirements
may be used as bases for comparison between techniques used, provided that the
requirement may be modelled at all levels of abstraction. We chose to focus on our
principal functional requirements (Reqs. 1a–b, concerning the handover success
rate) as a first basis for failure finding and to refine the assets if necessary. The
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handover success rate could be expected to be sensitive to a wide range of foreseen
and unforeseen events. As a scalar measure, it allows evidence from the V&V tech-
niques to be compared in a quantitative manner, whereas comparisons of Boolean
results may be insensitive to important modelling discrepancies.
After focusing on Reqs. 1a–b, we proceed to verify the remaining requirements
(Reqs. 2–8), identifying any further need to improve assets or the system itself. The
V&V of the full set of requirements provides a more comprehensive evaluation
of the system’s requirement satisfaction, whilst facilitating the evaluation of the
benefits of combining individual V&V techniques to complement one another.
As mentioned previously in Section 2.3, corroborative V&V will be carried
out in a reactive manner according to the resulting evidence. In terms of the order
in which we applied the V&V techniques, we chose to begin with a comparison
of formal verification and simulation-based testing for Reqs. 1a–b, to acquire as
much insight as possible into the system and our modelling assumptions before
committing resources to more expensive physical experiments. The subsequent
stages of V&V and asset modification, explained later in Section 5, were conducted
with the aim of achieving agreement on the handover success rate (Reqs. 1a–b) that
was corroborated by all three V&V techniques.
In order to apply our approach to the BERT 2 handover scenario, it was neces-
sary to implement each element in Figure 1. Appropriate tools for formal verifica-
tion and simulation-based testing were selected first. Requirements models were
then translated from the textual requirements in Section 3, and system models were
constructed to reflect the physical system. We developed relevant assets for a cho-
sen set of tools comprising the probabilistic model checker PRISM, ROS–Gazebo
and a CDV testbench for simulation-based testing, and experiment designs at the
BRL. We detail the development of these components in the following subsections.
4.1 Formal Verification
We chose PRISM, a probabilistic symbolic model checker (Kwiatkowska et al.,
2011), for the formal verification component. In PRISM, probabilistic systems can
be modelled as discrete- and continuous-time Markov chains, Markov decision
processes and Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA). In PRISM models, transitions
between states can be annotated with probabilities. The models consist of a set of
modules, each representing a different process within the system being modelled.
Modules are executed concurrently. Each module consists of a number of variables
along with transition rules for updating those variables according to preconditions.
Communication between modules is made possible by reading globally-accessible
variables and by synchronisations between transitions in different modules. Exe-
cution of a PRISM model starts from an initial state (of which there can be many)
and advances by application of transitions whose preconditions have been satisfied.
These transitions then update the state of the model. This continues until a fixed
point is reached when it is no longer possible to update the state (Parker, 2016).
Properties to verify can be expressed in a probabilistic logic such as proba-
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Figure 3: Inter-module communication within the PRISM formal model.
bilistic computation tree logic (PCTL∗) (Baier and Katoen, 2008). Rather than
outputting a Boolean value, PRISM can be used to output a probability that a given
property holds for some sequence of states, or path, through a model (Parker,
2016). PRISM has been used to model and verify a range of probabilistic sys-
tems such as security protocols (Duflot et al., 2013), biological systems (Konur
and Gheorghe, 2015), robots and multi-robot systems (Konur et al., 2012; Llarena
and Rosenblueth, 2012).
4.1.1 Formal Model
The PRISM model of the handover task consists of nine different modules: the
human, the human’s gaze, hand pressure and location, the robot (representing
BERT 2), BERT 2’s gaze, pressure and location sensors, as well as a timekeeper
module which keeps track of time elapsed in the model. Figure 3 shows how
the different modules within the PRISM formal model communicate. There are
four modules which model the human’s behaviour: Human, which models the hu-
man’s decision-making and communications with the robot; and gaze, pressure
and location, which model the human’s gaze, hand pressure and hand location.
Four modules model the BERT 2 robotic system: Robot, which models the robot’s
decision-making and communication with the human, and gaze sensor, pressure
sensor and location sensor, which model sensors which are tracking the human’s
gaze, hand pressure and hand location. The Timekeeper module monitors all of the
other modules to measure time elapsed.
The model consists of around 300 lines of PRISM code and is therefore too
long to reproduce in this paper. We could represent the PRISM modules as di-
agrammatic state transition systems; however, due the large number of states of
each module such diagrams are hard to read. Therefore, for illustrative purposes
the Robot, Human and Timekeeper modules are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6 respec-
tively. Additionally, the full code for the PRISM model is available online (Webster
et al., 2018a).
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Figure 4: The Human module written in PRISM.
module human 1
humanState : [0..99] init start; 2
[activateRobot] humanState=start -> (humanState’=activatedRobot); 3
[tick] humanState=activatedRobot -> (humanState’=activatedRobot); 4
[informHumanOfHandoverStart] humanState=activatedRobot -> 5
(humanState’=responding); 6
[humanIsReady] humanState=responding -> (humanState’=setGPL); 7
[tick] humanState=setGPL -> pDisengages: (humanState’=offTask) + 8
pStaysOnTask: (humanState’=setGPL); 9
endmodule 10
The PRISM code can be interpreted as follows. The first line in the Human
module defines the start of the module. The second line defines a module variable,
“humanState,” which is an integer in the range 0 to 99. Its initial value is set to
“start” which is the name of a constant integer set outside the module:
const int start = 0;
Lines 3–9 are transition rules, which determine how the state of the Human module
changes over time. For example, the first rule (see line 3) says that if the human
is in the state called “start,” then the state is updated to “activatedRobot.” In other
words, the first thing the human does in this scenario is to activate the robot for
the handover task. The rule also contains a synchronisation label, “activateRobot,”
which means that this transition must occur at the same time as all other transitions
with the same label. In this case, the only other module containing this label is
the Timekeeper module (Figure 6), as the synchronisations in this model are used
primarily to keep track of how much time has elapsed. Another feature of PRISM
is probabilistic non-determinism, which can be seen in lines 8–9 of the Human
module, in which the human may disengage from the handover task with a proba-
bility set by pDisengages or remain engaged with a probability set by pStaysOnTask.
These are modelled as two constant double-precision floating point numbers:
const double pDisengages = 0;
const double pStaysOnTask = 1-pDisengages;
For our case study, the probability that the human disengages (i.e., becomes bored
or distracted) is set to zero as we are examining the typical use-case in which the
human is always focused on the task. Similarly, we assume that the human’s gaze,
hand pressure and location are always within acceptable bounds for the handover
task, i.e., the probabilities that these are acceptable is set to 1.0. In this model we
are primarily concerned with the robot’s reliability, so we assume that the human is
completely reliable and engaged with the task at hand. Note that these probabilities
could be set differently if, for instance, we wanted to incorporate the human’s
tiredness level into the model, or if we wanted to specify that the person’s interest
in the task may waver and affect their gaze and hand pressure/location.
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Figure 5: The Robot module written in PRISM.
module robot 1
robotState: [1100..1199] init waiting; 2
handContents : [0..1000] init nothing; 3
testedTimeout: bool init false; 4
GPLWasOk: bool init false; 5
[activateRobot] robotState=waiting -> (robotState’= 6
moveHandToObjectLocation); 7
[movingHand] robotState=moveHandToObjectLocation -> (robotState’= 8
graspObject) & (handContents’=leg); 9
[graspingObject] robotState=graspObject -> (robotState’= 10
moveHandToHandoverLocation); 11
[informHumanOfHandoverStart] robotState=moveHandToHandover- 12
Location -> (robotState’=informedHumanOfHandoverStart); 13
[humanIsReady] robotState=informedHumanOfHandoverStart -> 14
(robotState’=waitForGPLUpdate); 15
[GPLOkSet] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate & humanState=setGPL & 16
gazeSensorState=gazeOk & pressureSensorState=pressureOk & 17
locationSensorState=locationOk -> 18
(robotState’=GPLOk) & (GPLWasOk’=true); 19
[tick] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate & humanState=setGPL & 20
(gazeSensorState=gazeNotOk | pressureSensorState=pressureNotOk | 21
locationSensorState=locationNotOk) -> (robotState’=waitForGPLUpdate); 22
[tick] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate & (humanState=tired | 23
humanState=bored | humanState=offTask) -> (robotState’= 24
interactionDone); 25
[tick] robotState=GPLOk -> (handContents’=nothing) & 26
(robotState’=handoverSuccessful); 27
endmodule 28
Figure 6: An excerpt from the Timekeeper module written in PRISM.
module timekeeper 1
time: [0..timeMax] init 0; // time in tenths of a second 2
objectReleaseTimer: [0..ortMax] init 0; 3
[activateRobot] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-40) -> (time’=time+40); 4
[informHumanOfHandoverStart] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-60) -> 5
(time’=time+60); 6
[movingHand] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-100) -> (time’=time+100); 7
[graspingObject] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-50) -> (time’=time+50); 8
[humanIsReady] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-10) -> (time’=time+10); 9
[senseGaze] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-1) -> (time’=time+1); 10
[sensePressure] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-1) -> (time’=time+1); 11
[senseLocation] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-1) -> (time’=time+1); 12
[tick] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-1) -> (time’=time+1); 13
[GPLOkSet] !GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-1) -> (time’=time+1) & 14
(objectReleaseTimer’=0); 15
[activateRobot] GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-40) & 16
objectReleaseTimer<=(ortMax-40) -> (time’=time+40) & 17
(objectReleaseTimer’=objectReleaseTimer+40); 18
[informHumanOfHandoverStart] GPLWasOk & time<=(timeMax-60) & 19
objectReleaseTimer<=(ortMax-60) -> (time’=time+60) & 20
(objectReleaseTimer’=objectReleaseTimer+60); 21
// (The rest of the file has been removed for the sake of brevity.) 22
endmodule 23
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Clearly, the Human module only captures the tiny fragment of human be-
haviour which is relevant to the handover sub-task. In more complex HRI scenar-
ios, the human module may have to be much more complex. Indeed, it is extremely
unlikely that a PRISM module will ever be able to capture the full complexity and
nuance of human behaviour. However, it is still desirable, and in fact necessary,
for V&V to model the human’s interactions with the robot, even if the model is
abstract and coarse-grained.
Real-world sensors do not work perfectly, and this is reflected in the formal
model. As a result, it is possible that the handover task will not always complete
successfully. The gaze sensor reports that the human is looking at the object only
95% of the time. The rest of the time the sensor reports (incorrectly) that the human
is not looking at the object. When the gaze sensor reports correctly that the human’s
gaze is okay, the gaze sensor has reported a “true positive.” When the gaze sensor
incorrectly reports that the human’s gaze is not okay, we call this a “false negative.”
Similarly, the gaze sensor may correctly report that the person is not looking at the
object (a true negative, with probability 95% also) or may incorrectly report that
the person is looking at the object (a false positive).
The part of the formal model which handles the gaze, pressure and location sen-
sor states can be seen in lines 16–22 of Figure 5. Note that true positives and their
corresponding false negatives are mutually exclusive, and thereforeP (false negative) =
1− P (true positive). The same is also true of true negatives and false positives:
const double pGazeTP = 0.95;
const double pGazeFN = 1-pGazeTP;
const double pGazeTN = 0.95;
const double pGazeFP = 1-pGazeTN;
The pressure and location sensors are given the same probabilities of 95% for true
positives/negatives and 5% for false negatives/positives. With no experimental re-
sults or hardware specifications to refer to, it was assumed that sensors would be
accurate “most of the time.” A reliability of 95% was therefore chosen as a first
estimate.
4.1.2 Logical Properties
Logical properties, representing requirements, were expressed in terms of PCTL∗.
We use the following PCTL∗ symbols (Parker, 2016): ¬p meaning that p is not
true, p ∧ q meaning that both p and q are true, p ∨ q meaning p and/or q is true,
p =⇒ q meaning that if p is true then q is true, F p meaning that eventually p will
be true, G p meaning that p is always true from now on, X p meaning that p is true
in the next state and p U q meaning that p is true until q is true. P (q) denotes the
probability of q being true in the initial state.
For example, consider Req. 3: “Once the human is ready, BERT 2 will hand
over the object.” This requirement can be implemented as a temporal logical for-
mula:
G (robotState=GPLOk =⇒ F robotState=handoverSuccessful) (1)
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which reads “it is always the case that if gaze, position and location are correct,
then eventually the handover is successful (i.e., the object is released to the hu-
man).” We can then find the probability of this formula being true on any given
path through the state space. We do this by forming a property in probabilistic
computation tree logic (specifically, PCTL*) which can be analysed using a prob-
abilistic model checker like PRISM:
P=?
(
G (robotState=GPLOk =⇒ F robotState=handoverSuccessful) ) (2)
Using the operation P=?(f) tells the model checker that we want to find out the
probability of the formula f .
Another requirement, Req. 1a, is that the probability of completion of the
handover task should be greater than 95%. This can be rephrased as, “the success
rate of the handover task is at least 95%.” This can be formulated as a property in
PRISM as follows:
P
(
F robotState=handoverSuccessful
) ≥ 0.95 (3)
This property states that the probability that the robot will eventually release the
object is at least 0.95, or 95%.
Note that the translation of textual requirements into logical properties is not di-
rect, since there might be different interpretations depending on the available vari-
ables, probabilities, and so on. Hence, this translation process carries the potential
for misinterpretation. For example, in the properties above, “handoverSuccessful”
is used as a synonym for “object handed over,” which may not be correct in all
cases (e.g., the human may drop the object after release).
The full code for the PRISM models and properties used in this paper can be
found online (Webster et al., 2018a).
4.2 Simulation-Based Testing
A simulator for the handover task was implemented in the ROS framework for
robot code development and the Gazebo simulator. Among Gazebo’s features are
support for 3D graphics rendering and various physics engines (including ODE4,
used in this paper). Although now available as a standalone Ubuntu Linux package,
Gazebo was originally developed as a ROS package and retains its compatibility
with ROS. A URDF (Universal Robot Description Format) file, used in ROS to
describe the kinematic structure of the robot, actuators, and sensors, can simply be
extended to describe parameters used by the physics engine such as inertial proper-
ties and friction coefficients. This compatibility allows the same control code to be
used in simulation and in the actual robot, providing consistency between simula-
tions, experiments, and deployed use. A screenshot of the ROS/Gazebo simulation
can be seen in Figure 7.
For the simulator, additional ROS nodes were constructed in Python to simulate
BERT 2’s sensor systems and embedded actuation controllers. The pre-existing
4http://www.ode.org
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URDF file describing BERT 2 was extended as described previously for use in
Gazebo. The simulated human behaviour was controlled by a ROS node written in
Python driving a simplified physical model of the head and hand.
Figure 7: Screenshot of the simulated handover task. The human head and hand
are represented in orange. The object to be handed over is shown in blue.
A testbench was incorporated into the simulator. The testbench comprised a
test generator, a driver, a checker and a coverage collector. Achieving the explo-
ration of meaningful and interesting sequences of behaviours from the robot and
its environment in an HRI task is a challenging task. For this reason, we stimulate
the robot’s code in the simulation indirectly through stimulating its environment
(e.g., the person’s behaviour) instead, and we use a combination of model-based
and pseudorandom test generation. Also, to alleviate the complexity of generat-
ing and timing different types of system inputs, the test generator is based on a
two-tiered approach (Araiza-Illan et al., 2016) where an abstract test is generated
first and then concretized by instantiating low-level parameters. The high-level ac-
tions of the human in the simulator include sending signals to the robot or setting
abstract parameters for gaze, location and pressure. Low-level parameters include
the robot’s initial pose and the poses and force vectors applied by the human during
the interaction. For example, we computed an abstract test of high-level actions for
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the human, by exploring the model in UPPAAL5, so that the robot was activated
(sending a signal to activate the robot and wait for the robot to present the object),
the gaze, pressure and location sensor readings were correct (set gaze, pressure and
location to mean “ready”), and the robot released the object. This allowed testing
Req. 3, “If the human is ready, BERT 2 should hand over the object.”
The driver distributed the test components in the simulator. A self-checker —
i.e., automated assertion monitors — was added according to the requirements,
described in more detail in the following subsection. Finally, a coverage collector
gathered statistics on the triggering of the assertion monitors. The simulator code
is available online6.
4.2.1 Assertion Monitors
For requirements checking, assertion monitors were implemented as state ma-
chines in Python, allowing sequences of events to be captured. If the precondition
of an assertion is satisfied, the machine transitions to check the relevant postcon-
ditions, to determine whether the assertion holds or not. Otherwise, the postcondi-
tions are never checked.
For example, Reqs. 1a-b and Req. 3 were both initially monitored as the fol-
lowing sequence:
if (sensors_OK)
wait_for(robot_decision)
assert(robot_released_object)
Note that, as with the logical properties, there may be different ways to implement
an assertion for the same textual requirement, and there is scope for misinterpreta-
tion.
The results of the assertion checks, if triggered, are collected and a conclusion
about the satisfaction of the verified requirements can be drawn at the end of sim-
ulation. The number of times each assertion monitor has been triggered in a set of
tests can be used as a measure of the coverage achieved by that test set.
4.3 Experiments
BERT 2 can be verified experimentally with respect to the textual requirements
using a custom facility at the Bristol Robotics Laboratory, as shown in Figure 2.
When seeking to verify probabilistic properties of a system, the experiments should
ideally provide an unbiased sampling representative of the system’s deployed en-
vironment. However, some phenomena may be difficult to reproduce naturally in
experiments due to their rarity, safety considerations, or other practical limitations.
Consequently, experiment-based estimates of their likelihood may be inaccurate,
5http://www.uppaal.org
6https://github.com/robosafe/testbench_ABV
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as may estimates of dependent properties such as the overall success rate of the
task.
In the case of the handover task, we cannot confidently seek an overall suc-
cess rate that accounts for the full possible range of conditions relating to hard-
ware, software, the environment and the human (including mood, anatomy, and
level of understanding of the task). Human factors are particularly challenging to
test in an unbiased way. This problem can be ameliorated by acknowledging the
constraints of the experiments or proactively constraining them to achieve a more
reliable characterisation of a subset of the system’s state space. The constraints
become a part of the resulting V&V evidence. Thus, the experiments deliver an
estimate of “success rate within some set of constraints,” instead of an estimate of
“overall success rate.” More affordable or coverable V&V tools such as simulation
or formal modelling may be employed to gain confidence beyond this constrained
experiment. Additionally, more detailed experiments may be performed to explore
a wider range of human factors affecting the scenario, and to determine the overall
success rate of the handover task beyond constraints. This is beyond the scope of
this paper, however.
As we were focusing on the “typical use case” of the handover scenario, in
which the human has a working familiarity with the robot and intends to complete
the task successfully, experiments were constrained accordingly. Each of the 10
subjects was given clear instructions on how to successfully complete the task,
followed by a practice session which ended when the task was successfully com-
pleted three times in a row. Subjects were instructed to try to complete the task
successfully in each test. All subjects confirmed that they had no physical disabil-
ity that would affect their interaction with the robot. The robot started each test
in a random pose. The object was placed in a fixed location, with random orien-
tation about its vertical axis (thus changing the orientation of the optical markers,
potentially affecting sensing of the object or influencing human hand placement on
grasping).
Approval for experiments with volunteer subjects was obtained from the Uni-
versity of the West of England’s Ethics Committee before they took place. A large,
diverse cohort enables a more comprehensive V&V to be carried out, but a cohort
of 10 adult volunteers was deemed sufficient for the purpose of demonstrating cor-
roborative V&V. We recruited the volunteers from the Bristol Robotics Laboratory
and the local area. Most had prior robotics experience: three were post-graduate
robotics students, one was a robotics entrepreneur, four were post-doctoral roboti-
cists. Two had no prior experience of robotics. All subjects signed a consent form
prior to participation.
4.3.1 Textual Requirements
For physical experiments, Reqs. 1–3 can be verified in their textual form based on
visual observation, informed by video recordings and user feedback as necessary,
e.g., to judge whether the human was ready or whether something has gone wrong.
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Reqs. 4–8 refer to software or physical parameters that cannot be reliably mon-
itored by visual observation. It is therefore appropriate to implement objective
monitoring to inform judgements as to whether the textual requirements are satis-
fied. To this end, ROS’s built-in rosbag package was used to record all sensor
readings, actuation signals, robot poses, and high-level control messages sent dur-
ing each test. Offline monitoring of these requirements was achieved by playing
back the recordings while running assertion monitors as described in Section 4.2.1.
In the case of Reqs. 6–8, these monitors depended on the robot’s own sensing
systems as the best available estimates of speed and spatial relationships. In real-
world V&V exercises, independent sensing should be used.
Req. 4 and Req. 5 refer to the runtime behaviour of the robot’s high-level
control code. Hence the monitors used in simulation may also be applied to the
experiment recordings, because the same robot code is used in each case.
All experiment recordings, along with the assertion monitor reports from sim-
ulations and experiments, are available from the University of Bristol’s Research
Data Repository (Webster et al., 2018b).
5 Corroborative V&V of Requirements 1a and 1b
After generating assets for V&V through different V&V techniques, we can gen-
erate corroborative V&V evidence about the handover scenario, according to the
plan described in Section 4.
To discover whether the V&V techniques corroborate one another, we compare
evidence of the handover success rate (Reqs. 1a-b) from formal verification (E1)
and simulation-based testing (E2). Sources of discrepancy are identified and inves-
tigated in experiments with the physical system. Experiment-based verification of
the handover success rate in the ‘typical use case’ (E3) is then generated. More de-
tailed system characteristics measured during these experiments are used to inform
modifications to the simulator, leading to new evidence (E4) that agrees closely
with E3. These simulations also reveal a new aspect of the system’s behaviour. All
insights gained up to this point are then used to inform modifications to the formal
model, and the resulting evidence (E5) is found to agree closely with E3 and E4,
satisfying our objective of achieving corroboration between the three V&V tech-
niques. The enacted workflow, depicted in Figure 8, is described in detail in the
subsequent subsections.
5.1 Formal Verification: Evidence E1
As described in Section 4.1.1, the formal model includes probabilities of certain
events coming to pass. Using the probabilistic model of the handover scenario we
are able to determine that handover has close to 100% success rate:
P ( F handoverSuccessful ) = 0.9999948082592586 (4)
22
Figure 8: A simplified representation of the corroborative V&V workflow enacted
in our case study, denoting the sequence in which evidence E1–E5 was produced
from individual V&V techniques.
That is, almost 100.0% of the time the handover task completes successfully. This
is a very high probability of success, meaning that there are very few paths through
the model which result in failure of the handover task. There are two reasons for
this. First, the model is based on a typical use case (see Section 4) in which the
human’s gaze, hand pressure and location are assumed to be correct at all times.
This reduces the likelihood of handover failure. Second, the robot waits for all of
its sensors to report that gaze, pressure and location are correct before releasing
its gripper. If any of these sensors does not report an acceptable value, then the
robot continues to wait. This continues until the modelled robot eventually “times
out” after 100 seconds. Given that the human always responds correctly in this
version of the model, and there are no other sources of unreliability in the model,
the only way the model can fail is if the robot times out while waiting for the
sensors to report that the human’s gaze, pressure and location are within acceptable
bounds. As there are far many more paths through the model in which the handover
completes successfully, the probability of success is very close to 100.0%.
The formal model has shown that BERT 2 satisfies Req. 1a and Req. 1b:
Req. 1a: At least 95% of handover attempts should be completed successfully.
Req. 1b: At least 60% of handover attempts should be completed successfully.
However it is important to note that the formal model is using very rough estimates
of the sensor reliabilities. To improve the accuracy of the formal model it is neces-
sary to find more accurate figures for the sensor reliability. These could be obtained
from manufacturer specifications, or through experiments with the BERT 2 robot.
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Despite the shortcomings of the formal model in its current form, we can still
derive V&V evidence, which we call E1:
E1: the success rate of handover is 100.0%.
5.2 Simulation: Evidence E2 does not corroborate E1
Evidence E1 can now be verified by another V&V technique. In this case we use
simulation as it is less costly than experimentation.
Visual inspection of preliminary simulations indicated that the object some-
times fell from the robot’s hand upon grasping or during carrying (“grip failure”),
a possibility not previously considered. A new assertion monitor was constructed
to capture this event in isolation. Additionally, the monitor for Req. 1 was adapted
to the form below to account for the possibility of grip failure. Compared with the
initial implementation presented in Section 4.2, an earlier precondition is used to
trigger the monitor: (robot_grasps_object). The original precondition (sensors_OK)
is now asserted as a postcondition and is preceded by an additional postcondition
(object_contacts_robot_hand) which is asserted repeatedly until sensing is com-
plete. This ensures that a verdict of ‘False’ will be returned if the robot drops the
object prematurely, regardless of any subsequent behaviour.
if (robot_grasps_object)
while !sensing_Done
assert(object_contacts_robot_hand)
assert(sensors_OK)
wait_for(robot_decision)
assert(robot_released_object)
In a set of 100 simulations of the handover task, 80 attempts then were completed
successfully. This result forms evidence E2:
E2: the success rate of handover is 80%.
Note that E1 and E2 disagree with each other, and are therefore not corroborative.
As explained in Section 2.3, there are a number of potential causes of such a dis-
agreement: inaccuracies in either the system models or the requirement models, or
in the tools. The latter becomes more unlikely when established tools are used.
In our case, the occurrence of grip failure was clearly the main source of dis-
crepancy. A modelling inaccuracy was present in at least one of the two V&V
techniques used: the formal model implicitly assumed a grip failure rate of 0%,
whereas simulation indicated 20%. Both the formal model and the simulator assets
were modified to account for this, as is shown in the following subsections.
5.3 Experiments: Evidence E3
Before committing resources to user experiments, a set of hardware experiments
was conducted to characterise the actual robot’s grip failure rate. BERT 2 was
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Table 1: User experiment results for the cohort of 10 volunteers, by subject.
Robotics experience is denoted by N (none), S (post-graduate student), D (post-
doctoral roboticist), or E (robotics entrepreneur). Failure modes are denoted by
R (robot grip failure), P (false negative pressure sensing), and L (false negative
location sensing).
Subject ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 mean
Experience E D S N N D S D D S
# training runs 5 4 6 6 6 3 3 6 3 6 4.8
# successes (post-training) 9 10 8 7 9 10 10 6 9 10 8.8
Failure modes P P, L R, P, P R L, P, L, P P
programmed to carry out the grasp-and-carry portion of the handover task 100
times, and grip failure was found to occur in 3 cases.
At this point, despite some discrepancy, formal modelling and simulation were
in agreement that the system satisfied the research-level minimum success rate of
60%. Furthermore, the simulation-based estimate was deemed likely to be conser-
vatively low due to the inaccurately high grip failure rate. It was therefore deemed
worthwhile to proceed to user experiments.
User experiments were carried out as described in Section 4.3. Results are
summarized in Table 1. To determine whether it was appropriate to treat our ex-
perimental data as independent samples of a single distribution, we investigated
whether there was any noticeable effect of learning or prior robotics experience on
the outcome of a test. A statistical analysis was performed using IBM R© SPSS R©
v23.0. A Kruskal-Wallis H Test did not indicate a significant effect of the robotics
experience categories on the number of handovers completed successfully after
training (χ2(3) = 1.5, p = 0.682) or on the number of training runs required
(χ2(3) = 2.872, p = 0.412). Furthermore, a Spearman correlation revealed no
significant correlation between the test number (1–10) and the total number of
human-related failures in that test across subjects (ρ = 0.220, p = 0.541, two-
tailed). It is possible that more extensive testing with a larger cohort would reveal
weak but statistically significant effects of these parameters. However, for the pur-
poses of demonstrating our method, our cohort and experiment design was deemed
to be adequate based on these results.
The handover was successfully completed in 88 out of 100 tests. As in simu-
lation, this can be taken as an estimate of the true success rate of the experimental
system.
E3: the success rate of handover is 88% in the typical use case.
Here the ‘typical use case’ is that described in Section 4.3.
Again we found notable disagreement between E3 and the previously gener-
ated evidence. A more specific discrepancy had already been identified in terms of
the grip failure rate. To seek closer agreement between the three V&V techniques,
we explored the potential sources of discrepancy in greater detail.
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The video recordings and ROS logs, including sensor data, were reviewed to
confirm the faults responsible for each failed handover in the user experiments.
The failure rate for each failure mode was identified as the number of occurrences
divided by the number of opportunities for that fault to occur. Results are listed
in the first column of Table 2. ‘False negative’ here was defined relative to the
subject’s observable actions. Thus false negative pressure sensing was identified
where the review of logs and videos indicated that the subject was observably ap-
plying pressure to the object but the sensing threshold was not exceeded. Similarly,
false negative location sensing was identified where the subject’s hand was on the
object during the sensing period but the robot’s location sensor returned a negative
result. Rates of other possible failure modes (e.g., timeouts or false negative gaze
sensing) are implicitly estimated to be 0% based on these experiments. This should
not be taken as evidence that these modes never occur, only that they are rare. Also,
rates of false positive sensor readings could not be defined because, after training,
there were no cases in which the subject did not apply their gaze, pressure, and
hand location according to the protocol.
5.4 Modifying the Simulator Asset
The observed rates for individual failure modes were taken as the best available
estimates of those properties in the typical use case and were used to tune the
simulator asset (and, subsequently, the formal model asset) to represent that case.
In the previous simulations, the grip failure rate of 20% was clearly much
higher than the experimental observation of 3%, while the simulated sensing did
not reproduce the other observed failure modes. Several aspects of the simulator
were refined with the aim of approximating the experimentally observed rates of
individual failure modes without sacrificing realism.
The accuracy of the simulated dynamics of the robot’s handling of the object
was improved by replacing default/placeholder values with more realistic estimates
of inertial properties, material properties, and joint torque/velocity limits.
The instances of false negative ’location’ sensing were identified as arising
from the motion tracking system briefly losing track of the object (hand location
is measured relative to the object) and reassigning its location to another point.
Mimicking this behaviour, the simulated motion tracking was set to reassign the
observed location of the object (but not the person’s hand or head) to an arbitrary
point in 3.1% of readings.
Based on the recordings, all cases of false negative pressure sensing seen in the
user experiments were attributed to the subject pulling on the object more gently
than in other cases. The exact forcing pattern applied by the subjects could not be
extracted from the experiment data. Instead, the lower threshold of the distribution
from which the simulated human pulling force was selected was lowered from 5 N
to 1 N through a process of trial-and-error to approximate the failure rate seen in
user experiments.
After tuning, a set of 500 simulations was run. In all tests the simulated human
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enacted the trace of high-level actions corresponding to the typical use case, re-
maining engaged in the task and applying their gaze, pressure, and location within
the relevant bounds. The results, included in Table 2, indicate that the tuning pro-
cess was successful in approximating the individual failure rates observed in user
experiments. Close corroboration is also achieved in the handover success rate,
although it must be acknowledged that this correspondence slightly overestimates
the true accuracy of the simulator; larger errors are seen in the rates of individual
failure modes. Nevertheless, we have improved confidence in the simulation as a
representation of the physical system and in the corroborative evidence provided
by each V&V technique. E3 is now supported by new evidence from simulation-
based testing:
E4: The success rate of handover is 87.8% in the typical use case.
Table 2: Test outcomes and occurence rates of individual failure modes for the typ-
ical use case, according to 100 user experiments and 500 simulations after tuning.
User experiments Simulation
Number of tests 100 500
Handover success 88.0% (88/100) 87.8% (439/500)
Runtime error 0.0% (0/100) 0.2% (1/500)
Grip failure 2.0% (2/100) 1.6% (8/499)
False negative gaze 0.0% (0/98) 0.0% (0/491)
False negative pressure 7.1% (7/98) 6.5% (32/491)
False negative location 3.1% (3/98) 4.2% (21/491)
Furthermore, the simulations exposed a failure mode not previously considered. In
one test, the handover success monitor returned no result and inspection of the logs
revealed that the robot’s control code crashed due to a runtime error:
RuntimeError: Unable to connect to move_group action
server ’place’ within allotted time (2)
This message indicates that a timeout occurred when invoking the robot’s motion
planning module. The robot’s high-level control code does not include any means
of handling such exceptions. Although rare, these events may significantly affect
the user’s trust if they occur in deployment, and could lead to violations of criti-
cal safety requirements. In our case, the error caused the only violations of Reqs.
4–5. The exposure of the error, which required high-volume testing and a realistic
implementation of the system, demonstrates a key strength of simulation as a com-
plement to formal modelling and user experiments. It is conceivable that the error
never occurs in the actual system, e.g., due to differences in computational load
during simulation. However, further testing on the real system cannot rule the pos-
sibility out completely. A more conservative approach is to adopt the simulation-
based estimate of the error’s frequency as the basis for further corroborative V&V
and design recommendations.
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5.5 Modifying the Formal Model Asset
Now that we have verified determined simulation evidence E3, we can attempt
to corroborate it using formal verification to address the discrepancy discovered
between E1 and E3 during the first V&V cycle. As described in Section 5.1, ev-
idence E1 generated by formal verification disagrees with evidence E3, generated
by experiments:
E1: the success rate of handover is 100.0%.
E3: the success rate of handover is 88% in the typical use case.
The formal model currently uses placeholder estimates for the reliability of the
gaze, pressure and location sensors on the BERT 2 robot. However, using some
of the experimental data in Table 2 it is possible to replace the corresponding esti-
mates in the formal model with more accurate values. In particular, we can use the
following values:
• Gaze sensor, false negative: 0.0%
• Pressure sensor, false negative: 7.1%
• Location sensor, false negative: 3.1%
False negatives and true positives are mutually exclusive, since the former refers
to when the person’s gaze/pressure/location is correct but the sensor reports (incor-
rectly) that it is not, and the latter refers to when the person’s gaze/pressure/location
is correct and the sensor reports (correctly) that it is. Therefore, we can infer true
positive values:
• Gaze sensor, false negative: 0.0%, true positive: 100.0%
• Pressure sensor, false negative: 7.1%, true positive: 92.9%
• Location sensor, false negative: 3.1%, true positive: 96.9%
As the experiments did not report any situations where there were false positives,
we assume that the rate of false positive sensor failures is 0.0% for each sensor,
and therefore the rate of true negatives for each sensor is 100.0%.
We can now set the probabilities in the model accordingly:
const double pGazeFN = 0.00;
const double pGazeTP = 1-pGazeFN;
const double pGazeFP = 0.00;
const double pGazeTN = 1-pGazeFP;
const double pPressureFN = 0.071428571;
const double pPressureTP = 1-pPressureFN;
const double pPressureFP = 0.00;
const double pPressureTN = 1-pPressureFP;
const double pLocationFN = 0.030612245;
const double pLocationTP = 1-pLocationFN;
const double pLocationFP = 0.00;
const double pLocationTN = 1-pLocationFP;
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Verifying the model we can obtain the success rate of the handover task:
P ( F handoverSuccessful ) = 0.9999954384256133 (5)
It can be seen that the success rate remains at almost 100.0%. This is to be expected
as the sensor failure rates have changed slightly, but it remains the case that the only
way for the handover to fail is for the robot to time-out.
There is still a significant difference between this success rate and the success
rate reported by simulation (87.8%) and experiments (88%). This may be, in part,
due to the way in which the sensors were modelled in the formal model. It was as-
sumed that sensors might make any number of “samples” while the robot is waiting
for the person to grasp the object in the correct way. Each one of these samples is
a separate event, in which the sensor takes a reading which is reported back to the
robot’s decision-making system. Therefore, each time the sensor takes a reading
there is a probability of failure, and false positives and negatives are possible. The
formal model reflects this, and the failure rates above apply to each reading taken
by the sensor, rather than the average failure rate per handover. The PRISM code
defining the gaze sensor module was as follows:
module gazeSensor
gazeSensorState : [0..1000] init null;
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeOk -> pGazeFN: (gazeSensorState’=
gazeNotOk) + pGazeTP: (gazeSensorState’=gazeOk);
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeNotOk -> pGazeTN: (gazeSensorState’=
gazeNotOk) + pGazeFP: (gazeSensorState’=gazeOk);
endmodule
The first transition rule says that if the robot is currently waiting for the person to
grasp the object (waitForGPLUpdate) and the gaze is okay (i.e., the person is looking
in the right direction), then update the value of gazeSensorState to either gazeOk or
gazeNotOk, depending on the probability of false negative and true positive. The
second transition rule does something similar for the case where the person is not
looking in the right direction. Note that the only guards on these transitions specify
that the robot is waiting for the person to grasp the object and that the gaze is either
okay or not okay. (The synchronisation senseGaze is simply used to keep track of
how long sensing is taking within a timekeeper module and is not relevant in this
example.) Therefore, these sensor readings can happen any number of times while
the robot is waiting for the person to be ready to receive the object and complete
the handover task.
This way of modelling the handover scenario produces less accurate results
when combined with the failure rates established by experiment. This is because
the failure rates determined were based on the number of experiments in which,
for example, the pressure sensor was seen to give a false negative reading. For
example, the probability of 0.071 for a pressure sensor false negative reading was
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obtained by dividing the number of experiments in which a false negative reading
occurred at some point (7) by the total number of experiments not interrupted by
gripper failure (98).
Therefore it would be more accurate to re-model the scenario in a way that re-
flects experimental reality; that is, the probability of a sensor failure for a handover
of the object should be based on the observed average rate of failure of that sensor.
This was achieved by modifying the gaze, pressure and location sensor modules in
the PRISM model:
module gazeSensor
gazeSensorState : [0..1000] init null;
gazeSensorSet: bool init false;
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeOk & !gazeSensorSet ->
pGazeFN: (gazeSensorState’=gazeNotOk) &
(gazeSensorSet’=true) + pGazeTP:
(gazeSensorState’=gazeOk) & (gazeSensorSet’=true);
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeNotOk & !gazeSensorSet ->
pGazeTN: (gazeSensorState’=gazeNotOk) &
(gazeSensorSet’=true) + pGazeFP:
(gazeSensorState’=gazeOk) & (gazeSensorSet’=true);
endmodule
In this revised model each sensor’s state can be set only once. For example, for the
gaze sensor, this is done by introducing a Boolean variable gazeSensorSet which is
initally false, but is set to true once a sensor reading has been taken, and is never
again set to false. Therefore, this model reflects the experiments more closely.
Verifying the new model gives us a new value for the reliability of the handover
task:
P ( F handoverSuccessful ) = 0.9001457729154516 (6)
The handover task now completes successfully with a probability of 90.0%. This
is closer to the simulation and experiment results of 87.8% and 88.0% respectively,
but there is still a noticeable difference. One possible reason for this is that the grip-
per failure rate, as determined by experiment and built into the simulation, is not
yet modelled in PRISM. The following transition describes what happens within
the robot module once the gaze, pressure and location are found to be correct:
[tick] robotState=GPLOk -> (handContents’=nothing) &
(robotState’=handoverSuccessful);
Here, once the robot’s state reaches GPLOk, indicating that gaze, pressure and loca-
tion are within acceptable bounds, the robot releases its gripper and hands over the
object to the person. Therefore the handContents variable is updated to reflect that
the robot’s hand/gripper is now empty, and the robot’s state is updated to show that
handover has been successful. To introduce the possibility of gripper failure, this
transition was modified to incorporate a probabilistic choice:
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[tick] robotState=GPLOk -> pGripperOk: (handContents’=
nothing) & (robotState’=handoverSuccessful) +
pGripperFailure: (handContents’=nothing) &
(robotState’=handoverUnsuccessful);
Now, one of two things can happen. The first possibility is that the handover com-
pletes successfully, as before, with a probability of pGripperOk. The second is that
the handover fails, with probability pGripperFailure. These two probabilities are
set like so:
const double pGripperFailure = 0.02;
const double pGripperOk = 1 - pGripperFailure;
Here, “pGripperFailure” is set to 0.02 in accordance with the gripper failure rate
of 2% determined by experiment (see Table 2). We verify the model once again to
determine a handover success rate of 88.2%:
P ( F handoverSuccessful ) = 0.8821428574571426 (7)
In a similar way a new transition was introduced into the transition system to model
the possibility of failure of BERT 2’s motion planning module, as described in
Section 5.4. This transition occurs at the start of the handover task as the robot
prepares to move its arm to grasp the object for handover. The revised transition
rule incorporates probabilities for the success or failure of the motion planning
module:
[activateRobot] robotState=waiting -> pMotionOk:
(robotState’= moveHandToObjectLocation) +
pMotionFailure: (robotState’=motionError);
These probabilities were based on the data shown in Table 2:
const double pMotionFailure = 0.002; // 0.2
const double pMotionOk = 1 - pMotionFailure;
Verifying the model once more gives an updated handover success rate of 88.0%:
P ( F handoverSuccessful ) = 0.8803785717422283 (8)
Thus the final evidence provided by formal verification may be stated as:
E5: the success rate of handover is 88.0% in the typical use case.
After conducting corroborative V&V of the handover task for the BERT 2 system,
it was found that all V&V techniques were corroborative on the probability of a
successful handover. The probabilities are shown in Table 3.
Having established confidence in our models using corroborative V&V, we can
assert that in the typical use case, Req. 1b is satisfied but Req. 1a is not.
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Table 3: Results of corroborative V&V.
Formal Verification 88.0%
Simulation 87.8%
Experiments 88.0%
Average 87.9% ± 0.1%
6 V&V of Requirements 2–8
In the previous section we focused our efforts on the V&V of Reqs. 1a–b in order
to demonstrate corroborative V&V of a robotic system. However, for the sake
of completeness and in line with best practices in engineering, we also attempted
V&V of Reqs. 2–8 using each of the three V&V techniques. These V&V results
are presented without reference to corroboration, but corroborative V&V could be
applied to Reqs. 2–8 in a similar manner to Reqs. 1a–b.
It can be seen in the following sub-sections that the different V&V techniques
do not all agree on how well Reqs. 2–8 are met. This is similar to the case study for
Reqs. 1a–b before corroborative V&V. Given enough time, it would be possible
to apply the corroborative V&V approach to this expanded set of requirements
in order to find the source of the disagreements between V&V techniques and to
improve the level of corroboration between them.
6.1 Experiments
For the user experiments, the full set of textual requirements was evaluated through
a combination of offline assertion monitoring and visual observation, as described
in Section 4.3.1. Table 4 presents the verdicts returned from each individual test.
Req. 1 is included for completeness. Note that for Reqs. 4–8, up to seven of the
missing verdicts were attributable to errors in the recording process rather than the
tests themselves.
Table 4: User experiments: Results on textual requirements from 100 tests. “Cov-
ered” indicates the number of tests from which a verdict could be achieved.
“Passed” and “Failed” indicate the number of tests in which the requirement was
deemed to be satisfied or violated, respectively. “Pass rate” is calculated as the
ratio “Passed”:“Covered”.
Req. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Covered 100 0 98 93 93 25 98 90
Passed 88 0 88 93 93 25 78 90
Failed 12 0 10 0 0 0 20 0
Pass rate 0.88 — 0.90 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0
As noted previously, the handover success rate in the user experiments satisfies
Req. 1b but violates Req. 1a. Correspondingly, violations of Req. 3 arise from
the cases of false negative sensor readings. Additionally, we see that Req. 7 is
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violated in 78 out of 98 tests; the robot occasionally violates its speed threshold
upon resetting, presumably depending on its initial pose. A notable “coverage
hole” is seen in this test set for Req. 2, as the human was judged to be ready for
the handover in every test. All other requirements were covered in at least 25 tests,
and no other violations were observed.
6.2 Simulation-based Testing
Table 5 presents the results of the assertions monitored in the same 500 simulation-
based tests summarised in Table 2, representing the typical use case. Comparing
Table 5 with the experiment results in Table 4, we see broad corroboration, but
with several noteworthy discrepancies discussed below.
Table 5: Simulation: assertion coverage and results corresponding to each of the
requirements (corrected for missing results) in a set of 500 tests.
Req. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Covered 500 53 446 500 500 500 500 0
Passed 439 53 446 499 499 500 437 0
Failed 61 0 0 1 1 0 63 0
Pass rate 0.878 1.0 1.0 0.998 0.998 1.0 0.874 —
All assertions were covered — i.e., all monitors were triggered at least once —
except for Req. 8. This indicates that the human and robot did not come within 10
cm of each other during the interaction. While this is possible given the length of
the object to be handed over, the experiments revealed that closer proximities are
seen in typical use. Hence this constitutes a notable coverage hole in these tests.
Contrary to the experiment results, Req. 2 was covered in several tests and
no violations of Req. 3 were observed. Further investigation of this discrepancy
revealed a potential requirements inaccuracy; the assertion corresponding to this
requirement expressed “the human is ready” as sensors_ok. In this sense, the
assertion monitor verifies only the high-level control of the robot, discounting the
possibility of sensor errors. Hence the results are still informative, but some modi-
fication of the assertion monitors would be required to achieve a more comprehen-
sive V&V of these requirements.
As noted previously, Req. 4–5 were violated by the single runtime error. The
observation that Req. 7 is violated in 63 out of 500 tests is consistent with the
experiment results.
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6.3 Formal Verification
Req. 2 says that if the human is not ready, the robot shall not hand over the object.
It was formalised as follows:
P
G

¬
 gazeState = gazeOk ∧pressureState = pressureOk ∧
locationState = locationOk

=⇒
¬
(
robotState = handoverSuccessful ∨
robotState = handoverUnsuccessful
)

 (9)
This property says that it is always the case that if the human’s gaze, pressure and
hand location are not correct, then it is not the case that the robot has attempted
to hand over the object. (Handing over the object results in either the “handover-
Successful” or “handoverUnsuccessful” states.) Verifying this property in PRISM
gives a probability of 1.0, meaning that it is always true.
Req. 3, which says that, “if the human is ready, the robot shall hand over the
object,” was formalised in a similar way:
P
G

 gazeState = gazeOk ∧pressureState = pressureOk ∧
locationState = locationOk

=⇒
F
(
robotState = handoverSuccessful
)

 (10)
It was expected that this property would be evaluated by PRISM as less than 1.0 due
to the possibility of sensor and gripper failures. Indeed, verification using PRISM
gave a result of 0.8803785717422283.
Req. 4 states that the robot always reaches a decision within a threshold of
time. This was formalised as follows:
P
G

(
robotState = GPLOk
)
=⇒
F
 ( robotState = handoverSuccessful ∨robotState = handoverUnsuccessful
)
∧ robotState = objectReleaseTimer ≤ 20


 (11)
Here the phrase “reaches a decision” was taken to mean that the robot has de-
cided to release the object. In the model, this can result in “handoverSuccessful”
if the gripper works properly or “handoverUnsuccessful” if the gripper fails. The
requirement specifies that this should happen within “a threshold of time” but does
not specify the amount of time. In our model, we specified that the gripper release
would take 2.0 seconds based on consultation with the robot’s users. Time was
quantified in the model using a “objectReleaseTimer” which is set to zero when
the robot determines that the humans’ gaze, pressure and location are acceptable.
The objectReleaseTimer was set to work in 0.1 second intervals in order to provide
adequate precision without increasing the size of the state space to intractable lev-
els. Therefore the property above captures Req. 4 as it states that once the robot has
found the human’s gaze, pressure and location to be acceptable, then it will attempt
to release the gripper (either successfully or unsuccessfully) within 2.0 seconds.
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This property was verified and the probability was determined to be 0.9999999999999996,
or 100.0% allowing for floating point arithmetic precision errors in PRISM’s com-
putation engine (Parker, 2016).
Req. 5 states that the robot shall always either time-out, decide to release the
object, or decide not to release the object. It was formalised as follows:
P
G

(F robotState = handoverSuccessful) ∨
(F robotState = handoverUnsuccessful) ∨
(F robotState = waitForGPLUpdate U
robotState = timedOut)

 (12)
This property specifies the probability that it is always the case that the robot
eventually decides to release the object (either successfully or unsuccessfully) or
times-out while waiting for the human’s gaze, pressure and location to update to
acceptable values. The latter case, where the robot times out, is effectively the
same as the robot deciding to not hand over the object.
This property was verified revealing a probability of 0.9979999999999996,
which was expected as the runtime error encountered in Section 5.4, which was
also included in the PRISM model, has a failure rate of 0.2% or 0.002. In order
to check that this was the case, another property was specified which says that the
robot can behave as expected in the previous property, or eventually encounter a
runtime error:
P
G

(F robotState = handoverSuccessful) ∨
(F robotState = handoverUnsuccessful) ∨
(F (robotState = waitForGPLUpdate U
robotState = timedOut)) ∨
(F robotState = runtimeError)

 (13)
This property was verified resulting in a probability of 0.9999999999999993, or
100.0% allowing for precision errors.
Req. 6 states that the robot shall not close its hand when the human is too
close, Req. 7 says that the robot shall start in a restricted speed mode, and Req.
8 says that if the robot is within 10 cm of the human the robot’s hand speed is
less than 250 mm/s. These properties could not be modelled, specified or verified
formally as the PRISM model of the handover scenario does not include a model
of a proximity sensor, and does not allow for speeds or distances to to be set within
the control system. It is possible, in principle, to re-model the scenario to include
such detail. However, adding complexity to the model adds to the computational
resources required to verify the model. In some cases, formal verification can
become intractable. Therefore, it may be more practical for V&V of Reqs. 6–8
to rely more heavily on evidence gained from simulation and experiment where
physical properties can be much more fine-grained.
6.4 Computational Demands
Properties 4 to 13 were verified against several different PRISM models represent-
ing the handover task. These models were created during the corroborative V&V
process shown in Section 5. The complexity of the PRISM model checking for
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these properties is shown in Table 6. From left to right, the columns show the
requirement and property verified, numbers of states and transitions used, time
required for building the model and time/memory required to verify the model.
PRISM 4.2.1 was used on an eight-core Intel R© CoreTM i7 laptop with 16 GB of
memory running Ubuntu Linux 12.04.
It can be seen that Properties 10–13 took significantly longer to verify than the
other properties. This is most likely the result of the use of nested temporal logic
operators (e.g., F , G , X , U) in these properties compared to Properties 4–8, which
use simpler formulae. Properties 9–13 took the same time to build the model (69.4
seconds) as these properties were all checked against a single PRISM model file,
which needed to be built only once before these properties could be verified. The
amount of memory used for Property 9 was not returned by PRISM, so this value
has been omitted from the table.
Table 6: Complexity of formal verification using PRISM.
Build Verification
Req. Prop. States Transitions T (s) T (s) M (kB)
1 4 42,960 236,643 36.8 0.203 2,253
1 5 31,120 150,955 61.4 0.147 1,741
1 6 15,614 54,969 84.0 0.062 997
1 7 15,615 54,971 90.0 0.057 999
1 8 15,623 54,998 40.6 0.053 1,003
2 9 15,623 54,998 69.4 0.002 *
3 10 15,623 54,998 69.4 20.3 1,536
4 11 15,623 54,998 69.4 17.7 1,007
5 12 15,623 54,998 69.4 24.9 1,843
5 13 15,623 54,998 69.4 50.2 2,048
* = Value not returned by PRISM.
Simulation-based testing was performed using ROS Indigo and Gazebo v2.2.3 on
a quad-core Intel R© CoreTM i7 laptop with 8 GB of memory running Ubuntu Linux
14.04. With all online monitors running, simulations were executed at a speed
of 0.8×real-time on average, taking 69.3 seconds per test. Of course, with the
advantages of batch and parallel processing, simulation-based testing remains con-
siderably faster than physical experiments.
7 Discussion
Through the corroborative combination of a number of V&V techniques, namely
formal verification, simulation-based testing, and experiments, we have determined
the handover success rate (Reqs. 1a–b) with greater confidence than could be
achieved by any of the V&V techniques in isolation. Each of the different V&V
techniques was used iteratively to corroborate the evidence found by the other tech-
niques during the corroborative V&V process. Although the experiments alone
would have returned a similar value for the handover success rate, achieving cor-
roboration in model checking and in simulation gives a higher level of confidence
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that the experimental results are correct and that the robot system meets its require-
ments.
The corroborative V&V process exposed key differences between the mod-
els used in the V&V techniques, specifically the false negative and true positive
rates for the gaze, pressure and location sensors, as well as the grip failure rate.
For Reqs. 4–6, the combination of simulation-based testing and formal verifica-
tion exposed important system behaviours not observed in the experiments, i.e.,
requirement violations. The observed runtime error (which caused violations of
Reqs. 4–5) could only be exposed through a high number of tests in simulation.
The subsequent inclusion of this error in the formal model and the simulator en-
sured that its impact on the behaviour of the system could be explored with more
coverability using formal verification and simulation-based testing. Furthermore,
corrected models for these two V&V techniques were obtained to balance cover-
ability capabilities, expressivity and realism.
Corroborative V&V has demonstrated that (i) the system satisfies Req. 1b, and
(ii) the more stringent version, Req. 1a, is not satisfied, to a greater degree than
if the individual V&V techniques were used without corroboration. Based on the
insights gained during the V&V process, several design recommendations could
be made to improve the handover success rate and to satisfy other requirements.
The sensing process could be made more robust to sudden changes in the human
motion, or to reduce the number of handover failures due to sensing errors through
mechanisms such as “debouncing” for the sensor readings. (Debouncing prevents
a single event from creating multiple sensor signals.) Adjustments to the robot’s
hardware or motion planning strategy may improve the gripper failure rate. A
speed limit needs to be introduced when the robot is reset, to avoid dangerous
unintended collisions. Also, as uncontrollable faults can be encountered during
execution, we could instrument our code to perform diagnostics and fault recovery
strategies.
For demonstration purposes, we focused on achieving corroboration relating to
a particular set of requirements, Reqs. 1a–b. As our examination of Reqs. 2–8
demonstrates, corroboration on some requirements does not entail corroboration
across all requirements. For Reqs. 1a–b, the end result was that all V&V tech-
niques agreed on the success rate of handover within a range of±0.1%. In an ideal
world all V&V techniques use accurate models of the world, and are accurate with
respect to one another, so that V&V evidence generated with one technique should
also be found valid by another. In practice, this may not happen. If two V&V
techniques do not agree, then we might look for inaccuracies in the system mod-
els, the requirements models, or the tools as described in Section 2.3. However,
after a number of iterations through the corroborative V&V diagram (Figure 1),
we may still have V&V techniques in disagreement. One possible reason might be
project constraints: we may lack the resources to continue to address inaccuracies.
Another reason could be that the V&V techniques may be lacking: for example,
model checking for formal verification can often be hindered by the state space ex-
plosion which limits the accuracy of models that can be checked. Alternatively, we
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might lack the computational resources to explore sufficient numbers of simulated
experiments, or we may lack the personnel to conduct sufficient numbers of real
experiments.
Therefore, in practice, corroboration between V&V techniques may not be pos-
sible. At this point we might assess whether our V&V techniques are up to the job.
Perhaps we should use an automated theorem prover rather than a model checker?
Or perhaps a two-dimensional physical simulation would work better than a three-
dimensional one? Perhaps we could create the simulation using a different pro-
gramming language or use a more powerful computer? The list goes on.
We might also decide that exact corroboration is not necessary if all the V&V
techniques are within an acceptable range. For example, we might have three dif-
ferent pieces of evidence, each generated by a different V&V technique:
Ei: System reliability is 92%.
Ej: System reliability is 98%.
Ek: System reliability is 93%.
Clearly all three pieces of evidence are not in agreement with the others. However,
the lowest value for system reliability given is 92%, which means that all three
V&V techniques agree on the following statement: “System reliability is 92% or
greater.” Note that this statement is implicit in evidence Ei, Ej and Ek. In this
case we have used corroborative V&V to allow us to determine a minimum value
for reliability. This value can then be checked with respect to system requirements
to see whether the system being modelled is sufficiently reliable.
There may be other reasons, beyond those discussed in this section, why we
cannot reach corroboration between V&V techniques, and there may be other ways
to remedy this beyond range-based statements like the one above. It is intended that
the suggestions given here may provide direction for managing corroborative V&V
in practical applications, as well as acknowledging that corroborative V&V is not
perfect. Rather, it is an approach to using V&V techniques in conjunction with
one another to provide a higher degree of confidence that a system will satisfy its
requirements.
As we have improved the accuracy of our assets on the basis of the results
presented in this paper, we could use the same V&V techniques to further explore
the HRI. For example, it is possible to explore human behaviours that deviate from
the typical use case, and incorporate aspects of user uncertainty and variability
beyond those used in this paper. A reformulation of the system and requirement
models under the new conditions might be necessary, as system traits (e.g., failure
rates) characterised under one set of constraints will not necessarily hold for other
sets of constraints. The V&V engineer should use their judgement in such cases as
to whether any prior asset modifications can be generalised to broader scenarios.
The V&V efforts towards corroboration can be helped by limiting (or bias-
ing) the explored region of the HRI state space to seek cases in which the V&V
techniques provide contradictory results. In our case study, we have employed a
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probabilistic formulation of the requirements that is relevant to HRI system as non-
determinism may arise not only from the environment but also from the robot and
the coupling between them (ROS-based robots exhibit high levels of concurrency
and run on non-real-time operating systems). Hence, we can compute conditional
probabilities, such as, “Given that the robot’s gripper fails, what is the probabil-
ity that the robot warns the user before the object drops?,” that lead to conditional
evidence.
In more complex scenarios, it may become more difficult to identify appro-
priate modifications to achieve better agreement between assets. Modifications to
system models may be informed by knowledge gained during V&V. For example,
useful insights may be contributed from systematic risk analyses, such as Fault
Tree Analysis or HAZOP (Hazard Operability). The latter has recently been pro-
posed for use in human-robot interactions to manage the inherent complexity and
uncertainty in such systems (Guiochet et al., 2013).
Increased modelling effort is an evident limitation of corroborative V&V. How-
ever, the use of multiple V&V techniques brings savings to this effort. As our case
study demonstrates, early use of more abstract methods allows gradual commit-
ment of resources to more realistic and expensive techniques. Discrepancies can
highlight oversights and areas of uncertainty, informing the judicious use of more
expensive techniques (e.g., to characterise the uncertain grip failure rate before
proceeding with user experiments in our case study).
For more comprehensive V&V efforts, Coverage Driven Verification (Araiza-
Illan et al., 2016) may be used with corroborative V&V, pursuing coverage of
the system in a systematic way in simulations or experiments. Hybrid systems
methods (Julius et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2006) might also be usefully incorporated
into corroborative V&V, although reducing entire HRI scenarios to manageable
hybrid models is likely to be challenging.
The object handover is only an example of a huge variety of case studies avail-
able in the HRI domain. Nonetheless, it is of uttermost interest in HRI, as close-
proximity manipulation tasks may be considered in a plethora of applications, such
as manufacture of white goods, cooperative handling and attachment of large sub-
components of aeroplane structures in aerospace assemblies, or care of the elderly
with early stage dementia by feeding them soup.
While our approach can be extended to any HRI application, in principle, an
awareness of the limitations of each V&V technique is essential. For example, hu-
man behaviour is notoriously difficult to analyse and assess, with open-ended and
physically-unconstrained interactions between humans and robots being some of
the most difficult problems in HRI research. In complex and nuanced scenarios,
we may wish to emphasise the use of experimentation and real-world operations
over simulation and formal verification as providing core evidence for corrobo-
rative V&V. However, it is likely that many complex interactions can be broken
down into simpler sub-interactions, such as object handover. In these cases, the
high levels of efficiency, coverability and precision offered by formal verification
and simulation-based testing can be more readily utilised.
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7.1 Use of Other V&V Techniques
The corroborative V&V approach can also make use of other V&V techniques, as
well as their accompanying assets. For example, hardware-in-the-loop experiments
allow hardware modules to be used alongside simulated hardware in order to verify
the behaviour of those modules (Martin and Emami, 2006). In terms of abstrac-
tion level, hardware-in-the-loop fits between simulation and experimentation, as it
makes use of both. Hardware-in-the-loop experiments can verify textual require-
ments as well as code assertions, and the system model is a combination of the
hardware module(s) and simulator. Therefore, we could add hardware-in-the-loop
as a V&V technique within a corroborative V&V approach (see Figure 9).
Figure 9: Corroborative V&V including hardware-in-the-loop.
Of course, we could also expand corroborative V&V to include operations of
the robotic system once it is deployed in the “real world.” Once the system is de-
ployed it is being used and operated by its end-users, so naturally, its “requirement
model” is the end-users’ actual requirements, rather than a model captured in natu-
ral or formal languages (see Figure 10). We could also use other V&V techniques
like Coverage-Driven Verification (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015).
The entire corroborative V&V approach is summarised in Figure 11. A set of
requirements models (shown in rectangles) are linked to system models (shown
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Figure 10: Corroborative V&V including real-world operations.
in octagons) through a set of V&V techniques. Information gained from V&V
techniques can be compared with other V&V techniques, shown by bold arrows.
This information can also be fed back to requirements models and system models
(i.e., the V&V assets) in order to refine them to improve accuracy if the V&V
techniques have shown that there is insufficient corroboration. The assets can then
be refined and compared to one another, before conducting further V&V until all
techniques corroborate one another. Of course, as we have shown in this paper,
this is an ideal case, and often full corroboration will not be possible. However,
the practice of corroborative V&V allows and encourages a systematic approach
to reaching agreement between V&V approaches. In turn, this approach to V&V
produces a higher quality of verification and validation than could be achieved by
using the individual approaches separately.
8 Comparison with Other Approaches
In this paper we have described corroborative V&V: an approach to V&V of robotic
systems based on combining different V&V techniques and comparing the evi-
dence generated by them. This was motivated partly by a well-known issue: the
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Figure 11: A more abstract view of corroborative V&V using multiple V&V tech-
niques.
use of a single method for V&V results in a compromise between examining the
full state space of a system (in this case, of an HRI) and modelling the system in
satisfactory detail.
8.1 Formal Methods for V&V
Model checking (Clarke et al., 1999; Fisher, 2011), a formal method used for
V&V, is exhaustive over the state space of a model but requires abstraction of
the full system (e.g., the high-level control algorithms, low-level control and me-
chanical behaviour, and the code that runs in the robot) into a finite number of
states. For this reason, formal verification can been applied to the analysis of high-
level decision-making engines for safety and liveness purposes, exemplified by our
previous work in HRI scenarios (Bordini et al., 2009; Dixon et al., 2014; Webster
et al., 2015; Gainer et al., 2017). Reasoning and high-level control algorithms have
been verified through model checking for other kinds of autonomous robots such
as unmanned aircraft (Webster et al., 2013) and multi-robot swarm systems (Dixon
et al., 2012; Konur et al., 2012). Theorem proving, another formal method, has
also been used to verify some of the control code of an autonomous robot (Walter
et al., 2010) and multi-robot swarms (Behdenna et al., 2009), highlighting the same
modelling challenges in terms of abstractions versus accuracy and expressivity as
in model checking.
8.2 Simulation for V&V
Although formal models can be run in simulation-mode when model checking is
not practical (Nielsen, 2014), dedicated simulators are preferred for robotics V&V.
Unlike formal methods, simulation-based testing is not exhaustive and cannot of-
fer proof of requirement satisfaction. However, simulators allow more detailed
modelling of the physical and low-level implementation aspects (e.g., sensors or
joint controllers in the actuators), and the robot’s actual control code can be exe-
cuted for V&V purposes. This is because simulators do not need to be exhaustive,
so computational resources can be used to model systems at a lower-level of ab-
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straction than is seen in formal verification. For example, a simulator was built
in MATLAB in (Kirwan et al., 2013), whereas Arnold and Alexander (2013) used
the Player/Stage 2D simulator and Pinho et al. (2014) used the SimTwo simula-
tor in combination with the ROS robot software development framework, to test
autonomous navigation control algorithms. Navigation algorithms were also vali-
dated in simulation by Sotiropoulos et al. (2017) by using MORSE, the Modular
OpenRobots Simulation Engine7. In our previous work, we developed simulators
in a 3D physical engine, Gazebo, containing models of the robot’s joints and con-
tinuous motion in space, along with its continuous environment containing objects
and humans (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016).
In other domains, such as microelectronics, both formal methods and simulation-
based testing are used, e.g., Electronic Design Automation tools. Simulation and
formal methods have been used in combination to overcome the limitations of
model-checking or to provide human-readable evidence of failures that can be ob-
served at runtime. Emulating these principles, academic formal analysis tools also
offer both model checking and simulation-based testing, such as UPPAAL (Nielsen,
2014), Event-B8, and the FDR2 tool9. Nonetheless, performing both model check-
ing and testing over the same formal model is disadvantageous when gaining con-
fidence in the resulting V&V evidence, as these two V&V techniques are subject to
the same modelling and coding errors. This problem is highlighted by Kirwan et al.
(2013), as they crafted a simulator (in MATLAB) and a formal model (in Promela
for the SPIN model checker) of their robot’s software (an autonomous navigation
closed-loop system) independently to overcome the limitations of simulations and
model checking and gain confidence in their results. Intana et al. (2013) combined
the advantages of simulation and formal verification for wireless sensor networks.
Simulations in an environment called MiXiM allowed discovering functional is-
sues in a high fidelity model, whereas formal verification in Event-B was used to
provide proofs of requirement satisfaction or violation to strenghten the discoveries
during simulation. They do not consider a course of action if the results from sim-
ulation contradict the ones from formal verification, as is done in the corroborative
V&V approach presented in this paper.
Experiments in real-world scenarios are costly when compared to simulation
and formal methods and cannot thoroughly explore the full state space of an HRI
scenario. Simulation and experimentation can be combined through hybrids of
human-in-the-loop and simulation or robot-in-the-loop and simulation as proposed
by Petters et al. (2008). However, corroborative V&V allows the use of multiple
techniques, e.g., formal methods, simulation-based testing, and experiments, to
verify and validate various requirements, eliminating the need to choose between
examining the full state space of an HRI and modelling the HRI in satisfactory
detail.
7https://www.openrobots.org/wiki/morse
8http://www.event-b.org/
9http://www.fsel.com/software.html
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8.3 Model Validation and Meta-V&V
Our corroborative V&V approach draws on multiple forms of evidence from vari-
ous V&V techniques to support a claim. In that sense, corroborative V&V can be
seen as a “meta-level” approach to verification and validation, in which V&V is
achieved through a comparison between the results of different V&V approaches.
The clear presentation of such arguments, e.g., by Goal Structuring Nota-
tion (Kelly and Weaver, 2004), is an important consideration in safety critical sys-
tems. Hawkins et al. (2011) describe the importance of separating a safety argu-
ment from its accompanying confidence argument, which justifies the sufficiency
of confidence in the safety argument. Similar to our approach, but more limited in
terms of variety of V&V techniques, the claims computed with a new variant of
formal analysis, based on models of flows instead of models of states, are validated
by experiments in the laboratory (Lyons et al., 2013). They applied the verifica-
tion technique to autonomous navigation algorithms for multi-robot missions for
Pioneer-3AT robots, but the validation stage only involved one robot. An approach
to test robotic software through co-simulation was presented in (Broenink et al.,
2010), where formal verification was used to find deadlocks through the FDR2
tool, whereas models of the robot’s software and hardware at different levels of
abstraction allowed a thorough testing of the discrete and continuous interacting
components. These multiple simulators run in a synchronised manner in a co-
simulation. They do not consider a course of action when finding discrepancies
between the formal analysis and the simulations.
In corroborative V&V, we seek agreement between multiple V&V techniques
with respect to particular set of requirements. Discrepancies may arise due to in-
accuracies or errors in one or more of the system models, requirements models, or
tools used. In several previous works, methods have been proposed for improving
the models. For example, formal models are refined iteratively if they produce a
spurious property violation after model checking in Counter Example-Guided Ab-
straction Refinement (CEGAR) (Clarke et al., 2000). An initial detailed model
is abstracted to form a simpler upper-approximation for which model checking is
tractable. After encountering a violation of a requirement, that model is iteratively
and automatically refined to determine whether the violation is spurious (i.e., does
not occur in the more detailed model). The level of detail that may be accounted
for by such techniques remains limited to that which can be formally modelled.
For a system’s software, this may extend to the concrete code design, but for com-
plex cyber-physical systems such as HRI, there will typically be important details
that cannot be adequately represented. Corroborative V&V may be seen as an ap-
proach in the spirit of CEGAR, with greater dependence on human judgement to
extend beyond formal modelling and accommodate system models between which
absolute agreement may not be achievable.
Many approaches have been proposed to verify and validate requirement mod-
els with respect to consistency, completeness, and precision. For example, Heit-
meyer (2007) developed a tool that performs formal verification (both model check-
44
ing and theorem proving) as well as simulation and even code generation by in-
tegrating multiple external tools. Nonetheless, further advantages can be gained
when multiple and independently-applied V&V techniques are combined to gain
confidence in their results, as we propose here.
Frameworks to verify and validate models for simulation tasks with respect
to accuracy and validity have been proposed in (Robinson, 1997; Sargent, 2013).
These models are developed from gathering real-world data, and their V&V con-
tinues throughout its simulation use. Dimensions that can be verified are: concept
(aspects to be included in the model, such as variables of importance), data (e.g. ac-
curacy, format), timing, control and information flows, and even the code against
bugs. Techniques that can be applied for V&V include animation, comparison
against other models, and testing (e.g., stress, sensitivity and historical data com-
parison). Nonetheless, the authors do not prescribe a methodology with associated
tools to achieve model V&V.
For ROS-based systems, the accuracy of a formal model with respect to the
robot’s control code may be more rigorously examined by standardising the formal
description of common ROS components, e.g., using the “ROS graph” formalisa-
tion developed in Aitken et al. (2014) to enable automated reconfiguration of ROS
systems. Recently, this formalisation has been adopted by Hazim et al. (2016) to
apply model-checking to the verification of timing properties of ROS processes.
Their approach shows promise for ensuring that the formal model is representative
of the system’s performance. Further work is needed to demonstrate whether it can
be usefully extended to capture inaccuracies in modelling the environment or the
requirements, which may be more challenging to model when considering physical
aspects of the system besides timing.
8.4 Automated Software Tools
For both requirement and system models, an approach to ensuring consistency is to
generate one model from another by a trusted method. Automated tools can help
in this process, such as translations from MATLAB/Simulink control models or
control code into formal models for model checking (Xie et al., 2004; Meenakshi
et al., 2006). Formal system models can be automatically extracted from real
code, as in (Corbett et al., 2000; Gallardo et al., 2012; Mukhopadhyay, 2015),
although not many tools are compatible with Python, a popular language for pro-
totyping robotics code. Logical properties may be automatically converted into
automata (Gastin and Oddoux, 2001), which may then be encoded as a monitor in
the form of a finite-state machine. Huang et al. (2014a) introduce rosmop, a tool
to automatically convert logical properties into monitors for runtime verification of
ROS code. Similar approaches could potentially be adopted in combination with
corroborative V&V for HRI to increase the level of confidence in the results, al-
though errors could still propagate when transforming one model into another, e.g.,
inaccuracies in a logical property will propagate to a monitor.
A simulation-based testing process can be improved by using tests that not
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only stimulate the system but can also find faults, using so-called mutation-based
test generation (Huang et al., 2014b). A system’s safety and liveness requirements
model, crucial in a V&V task, can also be verified for consistency, correctness
and completeness, e.g., using a combination of formal methods, static analysis and
simulation as in Heitmeyer (2007). If a system is to be designed and implemented
from a requirements model, certified code generators (Naks et al., 2009) and code
synthesis (e.g., refinement) (Ringert et al., 2014) can be employed. However, the
validity of the resulting code is dependent on the accurate representation of non-
software aspects of the system in the original model, which is especially challeng-
ing in the HRI domain. Furthermore, in practice, robots are commonly designed
and built by different interacting teams due to the complexity of the applications.
In summary, various techniques exist to promote correctness in modelling and
to bridge different levels of abstraction for V&V in robotics and other domains.
However, none of these spans the full range of realism and coverability needed to
thoroughly verify and validate an HRI system while systematically addressing the
possibility for errors to be introduced at any level of abstraction. Confidence in the
results of these techniques, if used in isolation, is thus limited. Our proposed ap-
proach does not prescribe specific V&V tools and techniques to be used. Automatic
translation and connections between the used V&V techniques can be added to the
approach, with discretion, to improve confidence or efficiency in the V&V exer-
cise. For instance, in our demonstration we exploit model-based test generation
and the ROS-Gazebo compatibility as additional links between simulation-based
testing and formal methods.
9 Conclusions
We presented corroborative V&V, a novel approach to the verification and valida-
tion of robotic assistants, to help in demonstrating their trustworthiness in the con-
text of human-robot interactions. There are a multitude of V&V techniques, from
formal methods like model checking, to various kinds of simulation, hardware-in-
the-loop, experimentation and real-world deployment. Naturally, there are trade-
offs between different V&V techniques, e.g., due to abstraction level, ease of mod-
elling and coverability. Furthermore, it is likely that different V&V techniques may
not initially agree on whether a particular system meets a particular requirement.
Corroborative V&V allows us to use the different V&V techniques together, play-
ing to their individual strengths. Where discrepancies between V&V techniques
are found, corroborative V&V can be used to “iron out” these differences, working
towards a situation where the majority of the V&V techniques are in agreement
with respect to a particular set of requirements for a given system.
Therefore, corroborative V&V provides integral assurances on a robot’s safety
and functional correctness through the combination of multiple V&V techniques.
The use of these techniques provides corroboration at different degrees of cover-
ability (i.e. the exploration of the HRI task) and HRI modelling expressivity, thus
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overcoming the shortfalls of each technique when applied in isolation. For exam-
ple, model checking provides an exhaustive exploration of a system model, but at
the cost of system detail, which is often lost in an abstract model. However, in
simulation-based testing, we gain high-fidelity detail by running the real software,
but we cannot test the whole state space of variables and behaviours. Also, an
iterative process between the different V&V techniques can be used if the result-
ing evidence presents discrepancies, refining and improving the assets (i.e., system
and requirement models) to represent the HRI task in a more truthful manner. This
allows a greater level of confidence in the resulting evidence about the safety and
functional correctness of the robot.
We demonstrated our corroborative V&V approach through a handover task,
a safety-critical part of a complex cooperative manufacture scenario, for which
we proposed safety and liveness requirements. We constructed formal models
(Probabilistic Timed Automata), a simulator (in the Robot Operating System and
Gazebo), and a test rig for the HRI (in the Bristol Robotics Laboratory), as well
as temporal logic properties and assertion checkers from the requirements. The
V&V focus starts with a pair of requirements, Reqs. 1a–b, for which we sought
corroboration between the three techniques by modifying the formal model and the
simulator. We then examined the rest of the requirements, finding previously un-
known functional failures in the system. Our results showcase the benefits of our
approach in terms of thorough exploration of the system under V&V at different
levels of detail and completeness and in terms of gaining confidence in the V&V
results through corroboration.
9.1 Future Work
We will investigate how the translational potential of our proposed approach can
be improved by more explicit evaluations of confidence. For example, Guiochet
et al. (2015) summarise various qualitative and quantitative approaches to assess-
ing confidence in V&V evidence. They present a quantitative model describing
the propagation of confidence through particular argument structures. The results
of our demonstration of corroborative V&V constitute an “alternative argument”
structure, in that separate pieces of evidence can corroborate each other. Where one
technique provides limited assurance — e.g. testing covers a limited state-space of
a higher fidelity model while model checking cover the full state-space of a lower
fidelity model — this may be accounted for by applying weighting factors to in-
dividual pieces of evidence provided by each technique. For probabilistic traits
of a system, statistical techniques such as the modified Wald method (Agresti and
Coull, 1998) can be used to quantify the uncertainty (confidence intervals) aris-
ing from the limited number of tests feasible in simulation or experiment. How-
ever, it should be noted that such confidence intervals do not describe the accuracy
of the models themselves. Hence the implementation of quantitative models of
confidence propagation will often rely on informal estimates of the confidence in
individual pieces of evidence.
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Finally, we intend to apply corroborative V&V to a broader collaborative man-
ufacturing task, of which handover may be a subcomponent.
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